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Amici recognize that when women
and men are sexually violated, verbally
or physically, they are 'targeted and
harmed as women and as men. Amici
are united in the view that same-sex
sexual harassment, no less than
opposite-sex sexual harassment,
violates civil rights to sex equality
under law. They believe that citizens
should have a right to seek redress of
such injuries.
Through their experiences and
work, amici have learned that sexual
abuse of men by men is a serious and
neglected social problem inextricably
connected to sexual abuse of women
by men. Male sexual aggression has
widespread negative effects and deep
roots in sex inequality in society. Amici
believe that perpetrators of sexual
harassment should derive no legal
immunity from the gender of their
victims. Amici thus share an interest in
the legal recognition of Joseph Oncale's
right to sue for sexual harassment by
his male superiors as sex discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.

FACTS
Joseph Oncale was employed from
August to November of 1991 by
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., as
a roustabout on an oil rig in the sea for
$7 an hour, seven days on, seven days
off. It was a dangerous, isolated job in
an all-male environment. As accepted
on this motion, three men sexually
harassed him there: John Lyons, his
Sundowners supervisor, and Danny
Pippen and Brandon Johnson, two
Sundowner coworkers.
On October 25, 1991, Oncale was
first sexually attacked physically.
Pippen grabbed him, pulled him down
and held him immobile in a squatting
position on his knees while Lyons
unzipped his pants, pulled out his
penis, and stuck it onto the back of
Oncale's head. Lyons and Pippen
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laughed. Oncale later that day learned
that most of his coworkers had seen the
assault.
The next day, Brandon Johnson chose
a dangerous moment on the job to grab
Oncale and force him to the ground
again Lyons pulled his penis out and put
it on Oncales arm. Oncale complained to
superiors.
That same night, Lyons and Pippen
attempted to rape Oncale as he was
taking a shower. As Oncale recalls it:
Pippen grabbed him lifting him off the
ground by the knees, while 'John Lyons
grabs the bar of soap and rubbed it
between the cheeks of my ass and tells
me , you know, they're fixing to fuck
me .. ." He believed the intentions of
Lyons were "to rape me" and those of
Pippen were "to assist and/or help ...
rape me, too."
Oncale complained further and tried
to arrange to get off the rig. The sexual
advances and sexual threats continued.
Oncale "felt that if I didn't leave my job,
that I would be raped or forced to have
sex .. . that if I didn't get off the rig, that
I would be sexually violated."
Oncale continued to try to work but
"couldn't sleep because I was afraid that
they would do something to me, I
couldn't fight, and I felt disgraced."
Oncale quit soon thereafter, stating on
his pink slip that he "voluntarily left due
to sexual harassment and verbal abuse ."
On December 5, 1991, he filed a
complaint for sexual harassment with the
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (E.E.O.C.). His suit for
sexual discrimination under Title VII
complained of both hostile environment
and quid pro quo sexual harassment: "I
felt that it was almost to a point where it
was my livelihood."
In 1993, Oncale began experiencing
severe panic attacks and other episodes
of long-term post-traumatic stress. He
became dizzy, numb in his hands, and
had a rapid heartbeat, symptoms that he
continues to attempt to control and treat
with medication and counseling.

SUMMARY OF
AGREEMENT
Men raping men is a serious and
neglected social problem with deep roots
in gender inequality. Courts generally
permit men who have been sexually
assaulted and otherwise sexually
harassed by other men at work to sue
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as women can. The Fifth Circuit
decision under review [here] is a
pernicious legal anomaly, categorically
precluding equality relief on summary
disposition simply because the victim
and victimizer are of the same sex. Its
double standard of gender justice denies
men rights because they are men - with
negative implications for gay and lesbian
rights as well, as exemplified by the
related Fourth Circuit approach, under
which heterosexual perpetrators may
commit acts for which homosexual
perpetrators are held legally responsible.
These decisions make accountability for
sex discrimination tum on who one is,
not on what is done.
The better approach advanced by
amici, building on the vast body of
judicial precedent, is not abstract but
concrete. Whether an assault is "because
of sex," triggering Title VII, is a factual
determination. Other legal requisites
being met, if acts are sexual and hurt one
sex, they are sex-based, regardless of the
gender and sexual orientation of the
parties.
The Fifth Circuit decision at bar is
bottomed on misconceptions about the
gendered nature of the sexual abuse of
men, particularly its connections to the
inequality of women to men and of gays
and lesbians to heterosexuals. Male
rape - whether the victim is male or
female - is an act of male dominance,
marking such acts as obviously genderbased and making access to sex equality
rights for Joseph Oncale indisputable.
The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as clear
statutory principles, requires recognizing
same-sex sexual assault as unquestionably
actionable as sex discrimination under
Title VII as a matter of law. The decision
of the Fifth Circuit in this case must
accordingly be reversed.

AGREEMENT
The foundation of Oncale and
fountainhead of its legal error is Goluszek
v. Smith, 697 F Supp. 1452 (N .D. Ill.
1988). Goluszek held that while women
sexually harassed by men have a Title VII
remedy, because women are unequal to
men at work, men sexually harassed by
men have none, because an all-male
male-dominated environment cannot
discriminate against a man as a man.
Sexually victimized men are thus denied
access to civil rights remedies when other
men sexually violate or demean them at
work in circumstances in which
identically situated women have clear
claims.
The many courts that have recognized
the actionability of same-sex harassment
claims before and since Goluszek have
relied on the plain language of the
statute, the clear weight of authority in
sexual harassment cases, and deference
to E.E.O.C. guidelines. They have used
simple logic, equality principle, life
experience and common sense. The
handful of courts that have refused to
recognize the claim rely on Goluszek.

I. Sexual abuse of men by men
is a serious social problem of
gender inequality.
Amici - as survivors of and experts
on male-on-male sexual abuse - submit
that Goluszek, hence the Fifth Circuit
reliance on it, incorrectly analyzed the
sexual abuse of men by men. Men are
discriminated against based on their sex
when sexually aggressed against by other
men. They are targeted as men usually as certain kinds of men - to be
victimized through their masculinity,
violated in their minds and bodies as
individual members of their gender, as
gender is socially defined.
A. Male dominance in society
includes sexual dominance of some men
over other men as well as over women.
Amici strongly agree with the Goluszek
court that Title VII - certainly as
amended and interpreted over time - is
aimed at rectifying sex-based power
imbalances and stopping male abuses of
power in the workplace. But men abuse
male power over other men as well as
over women. To conclude, from the fact

that women are differentially sexually
abused at work, that men who are
sexually abused are not abused as men,
and should have no Title VII relief,
reflects not only faulty analysis but false
assumptions, misreadings and
incomplete information.
The Goluszek opinion di.splays several
common myths about male-on-male
sexual abuse with which amici are
familiar in their work: that men, acting
as members of their gender, cannot and
do not dominate other men as well as
women; that when a man sexually abuses
another man, the actions are not sexual
and not gender-based; and that male
domination of some men over other men
is not part of the social system whereby
men dominate women.
In the world of Goluszek, men in allmale environments do not oppress other
men in sex-specific ways. As one district
court, in following Goluszek, put it: "This
theory focuses on whether there is an
atmosphere of oppression by a 'dominant
gender,' and thus assumes that the
harasser and victim must be of opposing
genders." Masculinity is assumed to be
uniform, gender making all men
sufficiently equal to one another that no
man can be in a significant position of
powerlessness relative to another man.
But as study after study has shown and
Michael Scarce discussed in his 1997
book Male on Male Rape: The Hidden Toll
of Stigma and Shame, all-male environments
are frequently characterized by extreme
hierarchy well-documented to breed
sexual abuse of men by men, whether
from "a sense of macho competition,
violence as a right of passage, an
expression of dominant status, or an
initiation of hazing."
Men are most often raped by other
men when there are no women around:
in prisons, in confined and isolated work
sites, in men's schools and colleges, in
the military, in athletics, in fraternities.
Men sexually abuse those they have
power over in society: first, women and
children; then other men, typically on
the basis of their status as men of a
particular age, physical stature, ethnicity,
race, disability, or perceived or actual
sexual orientation, that makes them
attractive for, or vulnerable to, male
sexual aggression.
The Goluszek court held that a man
cannot be made inferior as a man in an
all-male setting. Both Goluszek and

Oncale were treated as inferior men in
very standard ways - Oncale more
violently: Oncale'.s attackers were
asserting male dominance through
imposing sex on a man with less power.
Men who are sexually assaulted are
thereby stripped of their social status as
men. They are feminized: made to serve
the function and play the role
customarily assigned to women as men's
social inferiors. In terms that apply to
male-on-male rape generally, Susan
Brownmiller, in Against Our Will: Men,
Women, and Rape (1975), analyzes prison
rape of men as "an acting out of power
roles within an all-male, authoritarian
environment in which the weaker,
younger inmate ... is forced to play the
role that in the outside world is assigned
to women." This lowers the victim's
status, making him inferior as a man by
social standards. For a man to be
sexually attacked, by placing him in a
woman's role, demeans his masculinity;
he loses it, so to speak. This cannot be
done to a woman. What he loses, he
loses through gender, as a man.
Often it is men perceived not to
conform to stereotyped gender roles who
are the targets of male sexual aggression.
Goluszek was taunted for appearing
unwilling to oppress women sexually:
Because he did not conform to his male
coworkers' view of what his gender
behavior ought to be, because he was not
seen to be practicing sexual objectification
and subordination of women, he was
seen as less a man according to their sexstereotyped standards. Goluszek was
punished, ostracized, insulted and forced
to consume pornography to make him
conform to their stereotype of how a
man should be a man by subordinating
women sexually: Having his gender
questioned in this way marked
Goluszek's abuse as sex-based. Title VII's
goal of "strik[ing] at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes"
clearly intercepts such acts.
The reading of Title VII by Goluszek
and its progeny did nothing for women
except use their powerlessness to justify
doing nothing for relatively powerless
men. The errors in Oncale predicated
upon it should not be followed by this
Court.
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B. Denial of sex and gender in maleon-male sexual abuse maintains male
dominance.
The gravamen of Goluszek is that male
same-sex aggression is not gendered in
the sense that Title VII requires. Implicit
is an insistence that men cannot be
sexually dominated in their social status
or roles as men. The denial that
interactions among men can have a
sexual component, and that sexual abuse
of men is gendered, are twin features of
the social ideology of male dominance
with which amici are familiar as experts.
In this ideology, men are seen as sexually
invulnerable. This image protects men
from much male sexual violence and
naturalizes the sexual abuse of women,
making it seem that women, biologically,
are sexual victims. Denying that men can
be sexually abused as men thus supports
the gender hierarchy of men over women
in society. The illusion is preserved that
men are sexually inviolable, hence
naturally superior, as the sexual abuse of
men by men is kept invisible.
Accordingly, some courts jump to desexualize and de-gender male-on-male
sexual aggression in denying access to
equality relief; they call the behavior at
issue "horseplay," "mere locker room
antics," being "razzed;" and "a personal
grudge match." They pass it off as
"puerile and repulsive," "diffuse" and
"ambiguous," "offensive and tasteless,"
obsessive, insecure, vulgar, insensitive,
and mean, "crude and offensive,"
"physically violent and sadistic . . .
malevolence and spite," "cretinous," and
"trash talk." The point is to call the
behavior anything but sexual and
attribute it to anything but gender.
Amazingly, even gender is used to deny
gender, for example, "boys will be boys"
- a gendered description if ever there
was one - being considered not genderbased. That the behavior described may
be everything these courts say it is does
not mean that it is not sexual and
gendered, hence sex-based.
Denial that sexual abuse of men by
men is sexual in nature is a common
feature of male dominance. When a
man's testicles are aggressively grabbed, it
takes a lot to deny that the attack has
something to do with the fact he is a
man, but the district court managed it in
Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc. 895 F Supp.
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1288 (S.D. Ia. 1995). Attacks focused on
male sexual organs are sexual attacks,
hence sexual. With the Seventh Circuit
in Doe v.
of Belleville , 1997 WL
400219 (7t Cir. July 1, 1997), "frankly
we find it hard to think of a situation in
which someone intentionally grabs
anothers testicles for reasons entirely
unrelated to that person's gender."
As Rus Ervin Funk notes in Men Who
Are Raped, "Mens rape of women is a
hateful act designed to reinforce male
supremacy. So is men's rape of men." He
was abused as women are so often
abused - except that women, when
their sexuality hence their gender is
assailed by men at work, have a Title VII
remedy.

CiR

II. Sexual harassment of men by men

is sex-based abuse under sex equality
guarantees as a matter of law.
A. Sex discrimination law, hence
sexual harassment law, protects both
sexes.
Sexual harassment is legally recognized
as a form of sex-based discrimination.
There is no question that both Title VII
and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, under which
sexual harassment is also actionable,
protect both sexes equally, even if, due to
gender inequality in society, these
provisions, as applied, do not always
affect the sexes in precisely the same way.
The plain language of Title VII
protects all individuals from sex
discrimination: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer ...
to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his ... terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of
such individuals . . . sex .. . ." In
deciding that this prohibition on
discrimination "because of such
individuals sex" applied to men, this
Court stated in Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C. in 1983 that
"male as well as female employees are
protected against discrimination."
Other than in the Goluszek line of
cases, sexual harassment law has
uniformly followed the same rule for
over 20 years, prohibiting unequal sexual
predation at work regardless of the
gender of the parties. As the Ninth
Circuit put this principle in Nichols v.
Frank 42 F 3d 503 (9 th Cir. 1994), "all

individuals - male or female - belong
to a 'protected' group for purposes of
determining discrimination on the basis
of their sex." Just as men unquestionably
can bring Title VII claims when sexually
harassed by women, and women when
sexually harassed by men, nothing
except Goluszek and the Fifth Circuit says
that men cannot bring the same claims
women can bring, including claims
against men.
No one has legal carte blanche to
discriminate against members of their
own racial or gender group. Nor does
any basic principle of equality law or the
Supreme Court's recognition of the claim
for a sexually hostile working environment
restrict the relief available to survivors
based on the gender of discriminator or
victim. As noted by the Eleventh Circuit
in ruling that same-sex harassment is
actionable under Title VII, "There is
simply no suggestion in these statutory
terms that the cause of action is limited
to opposite gender contexts."
Title VII and the protections of the
Constitutions Equal Protection Clause, as
interpreted, form a single body of
equality law on this point. Not only is
the standard of review for women and
men the same, but this Court's basic sex
equality doctrine has been largely built in
cases of men seeking sex equality rights.
Equality rights, while based on group
membership, are personal rights. While
the Constitution, like Title VII, is rightly
concerned for members of groups who
have traditionally been subjected to
systematic discrimination, it has never
confined individual access to equality
relief to members of such groups.
Individual men may need equality rights
particularly when, as here , their situation
is exceptional among men and/or they
are in situations in which women, as
members of the subordinated gender
group, are more typically found .

B. Same-sex harassment is facially
sex-based when it is sexual and one
sex is victimized.
To be actionable as sex discrimination,
an impugned behavior must be "because
of sex." When a man sexually harasses
another man, how do we know it was
"because of sex"?
Drawing on over 20 years of judicial
development of the legal claim for sexual

harassment, the answer is the same for
men as for women, for gay men and
lesbian women as for heterosexual
women and men. It is a question of fact.
For purposes of motions testing the legal
sufficiency of sexual harassment claims,
sexual allegations are facially genderbased. When, in addition, one sex is
disadvantaged, sex-based discrimination
is unambiguously claimed as a matter of
law.
1. Whether alleged acts are "based
on sex" is a question of fact.
The first two appellate cases to
establish the legal claim for sexual
harassment, Barnes v. Castle, 561 F2d
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [quid pro quo], and
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1981) [hostile environment], took the
view that whether or not behavior was
sex-based under Title VII was a question
of fact. To overcome motions to dismiss
arguing that sexual harassment of a
woman by a man was not sex-based as a
matter of law because the same thing
could have beeri done to a man, the D.C.
Circuit thought that what mattered was
not what could have been done but what
was done.
Thus, in Barnes, the D.C. Circuit
held: "But for her womanhood, from
aught that appears, her participation in
sexual activity would never have been
solicited .... " Sticking to facts
circumvented the sophistic argument that
because sexual harassment could be
done to either or both sexes, it was not
sex-based when done to one. To the
Barnes court, the plaintiff's allegations
were sex-based due to "the fact that
[defendant] imposed upon her ... a
condition which ostensibly he would not
have fastened upon a male employee."
As the Barnes court further clarified,
"Appellant flatly claims that but for her
gender she would not have been
importuned, and nothing to the contrary
has as yet appeared, and there is no
suggestion that appellant's allegedly
amorous supervisor is other than
heterosexual. These are matters for proof
at trial. ... "
In Bundy, the D. C. Circuit glossed this
formulation, considering same-sex as
well as opposite-sex harassment: "in each
instance the question is one of but-for
causation: would the complaining
employee have suffered the harassment
had he or she been of a different
gender?" In other words, the conceptual

possibility of bisexual or homosexual
harassment was not allowed to preclude
a trial on the facts of heterosexual
harassment, in this case, of a woman by
a man.
Later courts followed the "but for sex"
test in case after case of male-on-female
harassment. The widely followed opinion
in Hensen v. City of Dundee, 682 F2d 897
(ll th Cir. 1982), formulated it: "In the
typical case in which a male supervisor
makes sexual overtures to a female
worker, it is obvious that the supervisor
did not treat male employees in a similar
fashion. It will therefore be a simple
matter for the plaintiff to prove that but
for her sex, she would not have been
subjected to sexual harassment."
Why "obvious"? Do courts assume
that if behavior is heterosexual, it is
gendered? They may. But there was no
allegation to the contrary. Nothing else
appearing, courts infer that the behavior
is gender-based as heterosexuality is
gender-based.
Denials of facial challenges in the
same-sex harassment context have taken
the same approach: factual.
Some judges believe that opposite-sex
harassment cases make knowing that the
behavior is sex-based relatively easy,
while same-sex cases make it
comparatively hard. Amici disagree. The
facts are no more likely to be clear or
murky in same-sex than in opposite-sex
cases. The view that opposite-sex settings
are easily gendered while same-sex
settings are not reflects a presumption of
heterosexuality. Correctly understood,
the same tests developed to determine
whether harassment is gender-based in
cases between women and men - is it
sexual? is one sex harmed? - apply
equally in cases between women and
between men.
2. Aggression that is sexual has
been treated by courts as facially
sex-based.
Sexuality is gendered in societies of
sex inequality. As a result, for better or
worse, in most instances, "[I]t is the
essence of sexual conduct between two
individuals that the one initiating or
inviting the conduct normally does so
because of the others sex," as the court
said in Tietgen v. Brown~ Westminster
Motors, Inc., 921 F Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va.
1996). Courts adjudicating sexual
harassment claims reflect this state of
affairs when they unproblematically

consider that sexual allegations are
gender-based allegations. As the court
said in Nichols v. Frank: "Sexual
harassment is ordinarily based on sex.
What else could it be based on?"
Without requiring genital proof,
courts routinely deem opposite-sex
harassment "unquestionably based on
gender" simply because the facts alleged
are sexual facts. The view "if its sexual,
it's gendered" has also guided same-sex
cases. In one male-on-male case, Tietgen,
"[t]he earnest sexual solicitation alleged
... provides a firm basis for the
inference that [plaintiffl was harassed
because of his gender."
The underlying question of whether
impugned treatment is or is not sexual is
itself a question of fact - subtle at times,
often anything but. Behavior can be
hostile, produce anguish or distress (and
intend to), or aim to demean, and still be
sexual. Producing fear in another, or
abusing power, can be sexually arousing
or potentiating to the perpetrator.
But the genders of the perpetrator and
the victim do not dispose of whether a
given behavior is sexual or not. One
cannot presume that behavior that is
sexual in opposite-sex contexts is not
sexual in same-sex contexts. Just as acts
do not automatically become sexual
simply because they are engaged in by
members of different sexes, acts do not
become nonsexual simply because they
are engaged in by members of the same
sex. No differential presumptions are
appropriate.
3. Harassment is sex-discriminatory
when sexual and one sex is victimized.
Concurring in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc. 510 U.S. 17 (1993), a case
of male-on-female sexual harassment,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg clarified
that, in proving discrimination based on
sex, "[t]he critical issue, Title VIIs text
indicates, is whether members of one sex
are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not
exposed." The E.E.O.C.s directive on
same-sex harassment uses precisely these
terms: "The victim does not have to be of
the opposite sex of the harasser. Since
sexual harassment is a form of sexual
discrimination, the crucial inquiry is
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whether the harasser treats a member or
members of one sex differently from
members of the other sex." Same-sex
harassment courts have applied this
"singles out one sex" rule with no
difficulty. Counting heads across the
gender line may not capture every sexbased disparity, but only one sex is
harmed in every federally reported sexual
harassment case to date.
Although not a question raised by this
appeal, even when both sexes are
victimized by sexual harassment, sex
discrimination can result, some dicta to
the contrary notwithstanding. The socalled bisexual harasser, eluding equality
snares by indiscriminately sexually
harassing men and women alike, stalks
the judicial imagination, cutting quite a
figure in legal hypotheticals. But in more
than 20 years, an actual equal-opportunity
harasser has yet to be sighted in federal
court. It is settled law in sexual
harassment cases that (1) plaintiff must
allege one sex is harmed to state a legally
sufficient prima facie case; (2) defendant
must plead and prove the defense that
both sexes are harmed, not raise it as a
defect in law pre-trial; and (3) to prevail,
the harm must be proven to be actually
equal. Nothing in the same-sex context
disturbs these resolutions.

C. Neither the rights of victims nor
the liabilities of perpetrators of sexual
harassment should turn on their
sexual orientation.
The sexual orientation of the parties
inevitably arises in, and is implicated in
ruling on, same-sex harassment. The
sexual orientation of the parties is,
however, properly irrelevant to the legal
sufficiency of sexual harassment claims.
An accused perpetrator's being gay or
lesbian does not make that person's
behavior sex-based, but sexual
orientation may be pertinent in
determining whether particular behavior
is based on sex in the totality of the
circumstances.
1. Access to sex equality relief for
acts of sexual abuse depends on the
acts, not on the sexual preference of
the actors.
Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, 511
F Suppl. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981), the first
reported case of same-sex sexual
harassment, held that a man fired
because he rejected the sexual advances

90

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL

of his male supervisor stated a claim for
sex discrimination under Title VII. Wright
described the behavior as "homosexual
advances," although so far as is known,
most men who sexually abuse other men
are heterosexual. The Wright ruling thus
established that same-sex sexual
advances were sex-based within the
meaning of Title VII in a context that
linked that result to the sexual preference
of the perpetrator.
The emerging rule is to regard sexual
orientation as not determinative of the
legal sufficiency of same-sex claims as a
matter of law but to admit it as relevant
on the facts. Perpetrator sexual
orientation does not make unwanted
sexual initiatives sex-based any more
than victim sexual orientation makes
unwanted advances welcome, although
both can be relevant (if sometimes only
minimally) to both factual
determinations. It is not categorically
irrelevant, as the court noted in E.E.O.C.
v. Walden Book Co., Inc. 885 F. Supp.
1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995), because
"[w]hen a homosexual supervisor is
making offensive sexual advances to a
subordinate of the same sex, and not
doing so to employees of the opposite
sex, it absolutely is a situation where, but
for the subordinates sex, he would not
be subjected to that treatment." Although
care must be taken that this approach
does not create an opening for
homophobic attacks, the rule itself
merely applies the same standard to
everyone.
Sexual orientation on its face disposes
of nothing. Gay men do not initiate
unwanted sex to all men any more than
lesbian women welcome sexual attention
from all women. Needless to say, from
knowing a person is gay, one cannot
deduce that they sexually harassed
another person. But the fact that a
perpetrator of same-sex harassment is
not gay - or not known to be gay or
provably gay - also does not render
same-sex sexual behavior not sex-based.
By definition, sexual harassment is
unwanted, so victim sexual orientation is
as irrelevant on same-sex facial
challenges on sex-basis as it is on
opposite-sex ones. The sexual orientation
of the victim cannot convert aggression
that is sex-based into aggression that is
not, or vice-versa.
Will Title VII access now tum on the
sexual feelings and imagined or real

sexual identities of perpetrators? Will it
have one sexual harassment rule for gay
sexual harassers and another for straight
ones? One for those whose sexual
feelings have coalesced, another for those
whose sexual feelings are diverse, diffuse,
denied, deniable, unknown, or simply
unprovable? Oncale sued for forced sex.
Why should the gender of those with
whom Lyons and Pippen are sexual,
when others want to be sexual with
them, determine Ontale's rights against
them for violating (what is conventionally
considered) his manhood?

2. Harassment because of
homosexuality is harassment because
of sex.
In practical terms, harassment because
of homosexuality cannot be separated
from harassment because of sex. The
gender of sexual object choice (although
not all there is to sexual orientation)
partly defines gender in society. The
gender of a person with whom one has
sex, or is thought to have sex, is a
powerful constituent of whether one is
considered a woman or a man in society.
The pitfalls of trying to separate the
two are illustrated by Dillon v. Frank, No.
90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir.
January 15, 1992). Dillon was taunted,
ostracized and physically beaten by
coworkers because they believed he was
gay. They called him "fag" and other
terms of homophobic abuse, he said,
because he was a man. The Sixth Circuit,
admitting his harassment was "clearly
sexual in nature," rejected his Title VII
claim, saying it was because of
homosexuality, not sex. So far as is
discernible in the opinion, Dillon is
heterosexual. In the view of amici, he was
harassed as a male. Women are not
called "fag." When women are seen as
effeminate, they are rewarded, or sexually
harassed in ways clearly marked as sexspecific. Dillon should not have had to
prove facts that did not exist, such as
that "his coworkers would have treated a
similarly situated woman ... differently,"
or to argue that "a lesbian would have
been accepted." Hypothetical
counterfactuals cannot be proven. That

the behavior was sexual, and that no
women were, in fact, subjected to it
(supported in Dillon'.s case by evidence of
clearly homophobic attacks) should be
enough.
Only men are subject to denigration
by gay-bashing taunts like "faggot." Only
women are subject to denigration by the
use of terms like "dyke" as epithet and
insult. Such abuse is inherently socially
gendered. Using sex with members of
one'.s own sex as derision, insult and
hostility denigrates the target's genderadequacy. Such terms, when part of
sexual harassment, create a hostile
environment for men as men and for
women as women, whether directed at
straights or gays. Because they attack
individuals as members of their gender
group, they are based on sex.
Separating sexuality from gender,
hence harassment due to gender from
harassment due to sexual orientation, is
impractical and should lead to
anomalous results, as Valadez v. Uncle
Julio~ of Ill., Inc.,.895 F. Supp. 1008 (N.D.
Ill. 1995), illustrates. The male defendant
had "crudely discussed his desire to
engage in sexual activities with [lesbian]
plaintiff and other female employees,
both lesbian and non-lesbian. He made
advances "to plaintiff ... because she
was a woman as well as a lesbian." He
made such comments to other women,
lesbians and nonlesbians, and no men.
The court found this conduct genderbased. It did not find defendant's
advances to straight women actionable as
sex-based and those to lesbian women
not actionable as based on sexual
orientation. As the Valadez court
perceptively noted, "defendant argues
that because [he] was aroused by the fact
that plaintiff is a lesbian his subsequent
conduct is not actionable. Whether
plaintiff would have enjoyed having sex
with [him] is not the issue." The
advances were doubly gender-based:
because she is a woman, and because she
is a woman who loves women. Disallowing
such claims will, as a practical matter,
leave lesbian women often without
recourse.
Although this appeal does not require
resolution of the question, amici submit
that sexual harassment because of sexual
orientation is sex-based discrimination.
When individuals are sexually harassed
because of the sex of their sexual

partners, real or imagined, they are
harassed because of sex.
First, formally speaking, those
harassed because they are gay men or
lesbian women are harassed because of
the gender of their sexual partners and
identification. If their own gender, or that
of their loved ones, were different, they
would not be so treated. They are
precisely similarly situated to
heterosexuals in having sexual
relationships based on gender yet are
treated differently because of their own
gender, the gender of their sexual
partners, or both.
Second, more substantively, gay men
and lesbian women, through challenging
the naturalness and inevitability of
gendered-unequal roles in sex, challenge
the sexual dimension of gender
inequality under which sexual violence
by men against women, and some men,
is widespread.
Third, usually both gay men and
lesbian women are not sexually harassed
by the same harasser. Equal oppression
- discrimination seen as based not on
gender but on sexual orientation, hence
not covered, however misguidedly may occur in this context scarcely more
often than bisexual harassment appears
to. In any case, sex equality rights are
individual rights. It is no answer to
victimization based on the supposed
gender-inappropriateness of one's
sexuality that others of another sex who
make the corresponding "error" are
also discriminated against. Equal
discrimination in this sense is sex discrimination two times over, not no
discrimination at all.
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III. The Equal Protection Clause
forbids exempting same-sex
harassment claims from Title VII
coverage.
The Fifth Circuits approach in Oncale
creates a blatant double standard in
sexual harassment cases based on gender,
and potentially on sexual orientation as
well, that denies survivors equal
protection of the laws. Men are denied
legal protection women have. Under the
Fourth Circuit's extension, straight
perpetrators can freely commit sexual
aggression for which gay perpetrators are
held accountable. And because sexual
harassment due to sexual orientation,
wrongly, is regarded as not covered by
Title VII, some courts have concluded
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that 'Title VII does not protect homosexuals
from harassment ... since such
treatment arises from their affectional
preference rather than their sex" (Polly v.
Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F
Supp. 135, 139 n.2 [S.D. Tex. 19931).
A dual system of rights on an arbitrary
ground violates every equal protection
standard known. As this Court said in
Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, the Constitution
"neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens." Surely, if officially
ignoring mens complaints of sexual
harassment while taking women's
seriously violates the sex equality
component of the Equal Protection
Clause, and of Title VII, and of Title IX,
judicially interpreting Title VII to ignore
mens complaints of sexual abuse by
men, while allowing womens complaints
of sexual abuse by men, does as well.
And this Court taught in Romer v. Evans,
116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) that homosexuals,
as such, may not be excluded from the
ordinary civil processes for asserting their
rights that are available to everyone else.
Without question, "[t]he guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to
[another] person," Justice Powell, joined
by Justice White, wrote in the affirmative
action case of Bakke v. University of
California-Davis in 1978. But the parallel
between this case and the "reverse
discimination" cases is more formal than
substantive. Those who claim "reverse
discrimination" say they are treated the
way the historically powerless are
treated. However, affirmative action
designed to redress and end arbitrary
social exclusion and white/male
supremacy does not violate the legal
equality rights of individual members of
socially dominant groups who thereby
lose their customary group-based
privileges. At the same time, it would be
perverse to allow members of dominant
groups to use equality laws to reassert
their dominance while denying access to
equality relief to individual members of
dominant groups who fail to meet their
groups standard for dominance and/or
are treated like members of historically
powerless groups are so often treated.
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Oncale presents a real, not imagined, a
direct, not reverse, act of discrimination
based on sex. It cannot be the case that
whites, wrongly claiming racism, can
destroy equality programs for people of
color while sexually assaulted men,
rightly claiming sexism, cannot sue their
victimizers. And far from undermining
the rights of those who most often need
the claim, allowing Oncale to sue under
Title VII not only takes nothing from
them but, by reducing the stigma of
sexual assault and increasing
accountability for it, benefits all sexual
abuse survivors.
Much sexual harassment jurisprudence reasons that, had a sexually
harassed woman been a man, she would
not have been so treated, therefore she is
harassed "because of sex." The present
case poses the question, What if she had
been a man and the same thing
happened? The answer is at once sexspecific and sex-neutral: both sexes are
covered for injuries through their gender.
Women do not have sex equality rights
only because men couldn't be treated in
the same way, this case suggests, but
because men could be and are not. And
when they are? Had he been a woman,
Oncale might not have been treated the
way he was. But if he were, his sex
equality rights would be recognized.
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